Introduction
The state law of South Africa consists of the common law 1 and the customary law. 2 However, in reality there exist various cultural and religious communities who lead their private lives outside of state law. 3 For example, the Muslim community in South Africa is a close-knit community which lives according to their own customs and usages. 4 Muslims are subject to informal religious tribunals whose decisions and orders are neither recognised nor reviewable by the South African courts.
5
The non-recognition of certain aspects of Muslim personal law causes unnecessary hardships, especially for women. 6 A Muslim woman is often in a "catch two" situation. For example, on the one hand her attempts to divorce her husband in terms of Muslim law may be foiled by the relevant religious tribunal and, on the other hand, the South African courts may not provide the * North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus), South Africa. Increasingly, South African courts are faced with complex issues regarding the Muslim community. 8 The last few years there has been a definite change in the courts' attitude with regard to the recognition of certain aspects of Muslim personal law. Contrary to pre-1994 court cases, the recent court cases attempt to develop the common law to give recognition to certain aspects of Muslim personal law. 9 This article attempts to give an overview of the recent case law that dealt with issues regarding the recognition of aspects of Muslim personal law.
Another issue, which eventuates from the current situation, is whether the South African legal order should continue to have a dualistic legal order or whether we should opt for a unified legal order or even a pluralistic legal order. 10 In order to address this issue, some comments on the current status 7 In this regard s 5A of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 might be of assistance. It reads: "If it appears to a court in divorce proceedings that despite the granting of a decree of divorce by the court the spouses or either one of them will, by reason of the prescripts of their religion or the religion of either one of them, not be free to remarry unless the marriage is also dissolved in accordance with such prescripts or unless a barrier to the remarriage of the spouse concerned is removed, the court may refuse to grant a decree of divorce unless the court is satisfied that the spouse within whose power it is to have the marriage so dissolved or the said barrier so removed, has taken all the necessary steps to have the marriage so dissolved or the barrier to the remarriage of the other spouse removed or the court may make any other order that it finds just." In Amar v Amar 1999 3 SA 604 (W) 606 the court held that the purpose of s 5A is to "create mechanisms whereby recalcitrant spouses can be encouraged or even pressurised into granting religious divorces where these are necessary to enable a spouse to remarry." The court found that the acts of the husband in casu were to withhold the get in order to compel his wife to amend an agreement between them and held that the most effective way to procure the co-operation of the husband to obtain a Jewish divorce would be to order the husband to pay maintenance to his wife until their marriage was also dissolved in terms of Jewish law. However, the section might be of no assistance to couples whose religious marriage is unrecognised in terms of South African law. They would not be able to approach a court for a divorce, because in order to obtain a divorce your marriage must be valid. See also Bonthuys 2000 SALJ 8-16 and Van Schalkwyk 2000 DJ 186-190 for a discussion of the facts of the case. See Barker 1998 DR 55-56 for a discussion of his reservations on s 5A of the act. 8
See Gabru 2004 PER http://www.puk.ac.za/law/per/ 1 Dec for a discussion of the practical problems Muslim women experience on a daily level. 9
See par 3. 10 Cachalia Muslim Family Law 31 et seq discusses three "models", which he refers to as "legal unity", "legal integration" and "legal pluralism". The first model presumes a single unified system that allows cultural and religious differences. For example, a code of 3/34 of Muslim personal law will be made and, finally, in order to contribute to the debate regarding the recognition of Muslim personal law, optional models for the recognition of Muslim personal law will briefly be evaluated.
The author is fully aware of the complexity and sensitivity of the various issues with regard to the status of Muslim personal law in South Africa. This article does not profess to be a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the various issues concerned. It merely comments on some of the issues as identified in the court cases and finally attempts to give a brief analysis of various models for the future recognition of aspects of Muslim personal law.
Muslim personal law in context
The legislative recognition, these cases had to resort to the common law in order to seek ways to protect the interests of the aggrieved parties who approached them. In the following paragraph some of these decisions will be discussed.
Viewpoints of the courts
In terms of sections 8(3) and 39 (2) 9/34 society" or that it was "fundamentally opposed to our principles and institutions" as expressed in the Ismail case 53 and said:
[I]t is quite inimical to all the values of the new South Africa for one group to impose its values on another and that the Courts should only brand a contract as offensive to public policy if it is offensive to those values which are shared by the community at large, by all rightthinking people in the community and not only by one section of it.
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Secondly, Farlam j referred to the principles of equality, diversity and multiculturalism, which conform to the values of the 1993 Constitution. In his opinion these values "irradiate" the concept of public policy that the courts have to apply. 55 He differed from the viewpoint expressed in the Ismail case, namely that the contracts in issue were contra bonos mores and held:
In my opinion the 'radiating' effect of the values underlying the new Constitution 56 is such that neither of these grounds for holding the contractual terms under consideration in this case to be unlawful can be supported.
57
Finally he came to the conclusion that the marriage contract between the parties was not contra bonos mores. As a result the Ismail case no longer "operates to preclude a court from enforcing claims such as those brought by" parties to an Islamic union. The court then proceeded to consider the counterclaim of the defendant and awarded her arrear maintenance after considering the facts. 58 The question of whether the defendant was entitled to a 53 707E (own emphasis). 54 707G. 55 707H-709A. 56 The 1993 Constitution. 57 709C. 58 711D-714F. The defendant claimed arrear maintenance from January 1977 (date of marriage) to 14 January 1993 (third month after third talaq was served). The court pointed out that the parties concluded a contract in terms of which they agreed that their marriage would be governed by Islamic law. It was common cause that the rules of the Shafi'i school are relevant in this case. Under the Shafi'i school the plaintiff is obliged to maintain his wife during their marriage and for a period of three months after talaq. It is therefore clear that plaintiff and defendant agreed (in terms of their marriage contract) that plaintiff would maintain defendant during their marriage and for three months after talaq, and that any unpaid maintenance would accumulate as a debt, and that prescription of such a debt would not be possible. The court held, however, that prescription is for the benefit of the general public and that an agreement to renounce prescription (as in this case) would be against public policy. Therefore, plaintiff is only (3) of the Constitution. 68 1722E. 69 "When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights." 70 "A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right." 71 "When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a court -(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to 12/34 39(2) does not give a general power to the courts to develop the common law "to promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights." The court argues that, if section 39(2) is read with sections 8(2) and (3), it is clear that the development of the common law the legislature had in mind is development … in order to give effect to a right in the Bill … to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right' … It is not intended that the Court is to have a general power of development of the common law to 'promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights' independently of giving effect, when applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person, to 'a right in the Bill … to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right.
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The applicant's counsel argued that that the right to equality 73 that includes the right not to be unfairly discriminated against on the grounds of marital status or religion and the right to dignity are relevant to the facts of the case. The court found that the appellant had a good cause of action, based on the fact that the deceased had a legally enforceable duty to support the appellant;
the duty arose from a solemn marriage in accordance with the tenets of a recognised and accepted faith; and that it was a duty which deserved protection and recognition for the purposes of the dependant's action. 83 The question was not whether the marriage was lawful at common law, but whether the deceased had a duty to support the appellant during the subsistence of the marriage. 84 The court based its findings on an "important shift in the identifiable boni mores of the community" that "must also manifest itself in a corresponding evolution in the relevant parameters of application in 16/34 proceedings were instituted. The four children's mothers and natural guardians are the third and fourth respondents. After the death of Mr Daniels, the late MC Daniels and the third, fifth, sixth and seventh respondents threatened to throw the applicant out of the house.
The applicant approached the High Court for the first time in 1998 for an order declaring that she was entitled to the said house. 93 The application was dismissed on various grounds that included, inter alia, the non-compliance of some of the procedural requirements by the applicant and the non-recognition of the validity of the Muslim marriage of Mr Daniels and the applicant. The court was also of the opinion that new legislation had to be promulgated in order to recognise the validity of Muslim marriages in South Africa.
The applicant then approached the High Court for a second time for an order declaring that she was a spouse 94 for the purposes of the Intestate Succession Act and that she is, therefore, an heir in his deceased estate.
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Secondly, she applied for an order declaring that she was a survivor 96 of the deceased and that she accordingly had a claim for maintenance in terms of The court reluctantly concluded that the word "spouse" could not be interpreted so as to include a person in the dire position of the applicant and held that the word "spouse" had to be given its "traditional, limited meaning".
Van Heerden j was of the view that the word "spouse" only applied to spouses whose marriage was valid in terms of South African law and, accordingly, the two acts could not be interpreted to include the parties to a Muslim marriage.
As a result the applicant was not a "spouse" (or "survivor") for the purposes of the acts.
97
The third issue was whether the failure to define a husband or wife (who Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the President is constitutional, and must confirm any order of invalidity made by the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court, or a court of similar status, before that order has any force." 102 The applicant was concerned that the Constitutional Court might refuse to confirm the declaration of invalidity and accordingly she applied for leave to appeal against the interpretation given to the word "spouse", should the application for confirmation fail. The High Court was of the opinion that a contextual and purposive reading of the act could well lead to a different order by the Constitutional Court and granted conditional leave to appeal as requested by the applicant. See par [14] .
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Muslim couple has a choice to conclude a marriage that is valid in terms of South African law.
Without much ado, Sachs j commenced his majority judgment with the observation that the word "spouse" in its ordinary meaning includes parties to a Muslim marriage. According to him the exclusion of parties to a Muslim marriage in the past emanated from a linguistically strained used of the word spouse that flowed from a "culturally and racially hegemonic appropriation of it". 103 He points out that a restricted interpretation of the word "spouse" is:
… discriminatory, expressly exalting a particular concept of marriage, flowing initially from a particular world-view, as the ideal against which Muslim marriages were measured and found to be wanting. 
Legislative recognition of Muslim personal law
A general act, which may be referred to as the Muslim Family Law Application Act, could be enacted to give recognition to uncodified Muslim personal law. dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties and wakfs (other than charities and charitable institutions and religious endowments).
The act could also make provision for the institution, status and role of the Ulama, which could function in a similar way as traditional authorities in terms of customary law. The act does not have to contain substantive provisions of Muslim personal law and it could be left to either the courts or legislature to develop the substantive provisions of Muslim personal law.
111
If Muslim personal law is recognised by means of a general act the Constitution will be directly applicable thereto through the intervention of the legislature. 112 One of the advantages of such recognition is that Muslim personal law would be subject to the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights, which would ensure the striking down of unconstitutional rules of Muslim personal law. But approaching the courts has been a costly and time-consuming affair. There is also no guarantee that women who are discriminated against would have the means and strength to approach the courts for protection of their rights. If
Muslim personal law is recognised in South Africa the question regarding jurisdiction of courts could become an important one. Would the existing courts have the jurisdiction to decide on matters of religion or would the jurisdiction of the Ulama be extended to receive binding jurisdiction similar to that of the courts of South Africa? It would also be a possibility to deal with the matter first through the Ulama, and if the parties are not satisfied with the outcome they may go to the South African courts (more or less the same as the current system of customary courts).
113
Another problem emanating from the previous one has to do with the developmental function of the courts. In terms of sections 8(2), 39(2) and 173 the courts have the power to develop the common law and customary law to 111 Something similar to the common law that could either be developed by the courts or by means of legislation. 112 S 8(1) of the Constitution. The horizontal and vertical debate regarding the application of the Bill of Rights is irrelevant where legislative enactments are concerned. The common law is of general application, whilst the application of Muslim personal law will be regulated by means of legislation. 113 The same question may be asked regarding the Beth Din of the Jews.
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promote the "spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights." These sections make no mention of other legal systems that may be recognised in terms of section 15(3) of the Constitution. It is, therefore, doubtful whether the courts would have the power to develop Muslim personal law in order to promote the "spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights". The courts would, however, be entitled to strike down a rule of Muslim personal law that is unconstitutional. Declaring a rule of Muslim personal law unconstitutional without the power to develop such a rule would leave a vacuum in Muslim personal law, which could only be rectified by means of legislation or by developing the common law.
114
A third problem, which could emanate from a general act recognising Muslim personal law, has to do with legal uncertainty. Currently in South Africa there is a lack of reliable sources regarding Muslim personal law. Very few universities teach the principles of religious legal systems and few scholars or court officials have any knowledge of these legal systems. It would, therefore, be risky to leave it in the hands of the judiciary and legal practitioners to determine the content of Muslim personal law in order to apply it in practice.
5
Legislative recognition of codified Muslim personal law Although the codification of Muslim personal law would obviate some of the criticisms raised in the previous proposal, the recognition of codified Muslim personal law would give rise to a plurality of legal systems, which has its own unique problems. 120 However plausible, South Africa should be cautious of a plurality of legal systems. Experience in other countries has shown that such a model leads to conflict and legal uncertainty. India, which has a Muslim minority of approximately 11½%, has a secular system of law that gives recognition to a variety of legal systems. As already stated, the seemingly blissful co-existence of the various legal systems leads to conflict and uncertainty and, in some instances, to the detriment of women living in India.
Courts are often so caught up in issues dealing with conflict of laws that the real issues disappear in a mist of confusion and perplexity.
Other issues that must also be dealt with have to do with the conflict of laws. If
Muslim personal law is recognised, persons should have the choice to opt for Muslim personal law or the law of South Africa. Problems regarding choice of [117] [118] [119] [120] [121] [122] [123] [124] [125] [126] [127] . Some writers take a more liberal view. According to them, Muslim law consists of secular and religious elements. The religious element includes the five basic concepts of Islam, which are immutable and may not be changed. These concepts include Kalima (the unity of God and the prophetic character of God), Namaz (prayer five times a day), Ramajdan (feasting during certain days), Zakkadh (charity to the poor) and Jajj (pilgrimage to the holy city of Mekka). The secular element includes, inter alia, the law of crimes, the law of evidence, the law of marriage, the law of contract and the law of succession. These matters are susceptible to change and may be altered. Rathnapaki Uniform Civil Code 11-16. The prevailing circumstances in terms of customary law (the so-called discarded wife) also serve as an example of the difficulties that may be experienced if there is more than one legal system in operation. 
Conclusion
A plurality of personal laws in South Africa should be prevented as far as possible. The South African system should be developed to accommodate the religious and cultural diversity of the country. Up to now many religious practices, such as religious marriages, were condemned by the courts and legislature due to their potentially polygynous nature. It will be very difficult for the government to substantiate why recognition is given to polygynous customary marriages whilst polygynous religious marriages are invalid due to their potentially polygynous nature. Although, at present, it is mainly the Muslim community that demands the recognition of Muslim personal law, the possibility that other religious communities in South Africa will soon follow is not excluded.
It is important to recognise and debate the issues regarding the recognition of religious legal systems from the onset. In doing so, it is important to reflect on the legal and social position of women within these legal systems before any legislative recognition is given to personal legal systems that discriminate against women.
The Draft Bill alleviates some of the problems experienced by Muslim couples as a result of the non-recognition of their marriages in South Africa. However, if the Draft Bill is enacted into legislation and it does not receive universal support from the Muslim community in South Africa, it will become mere paper law.
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